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PROTECTING MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS 
IN CLOSE CORPORATIONS: MODEliNG 
CZECH INVESTOR PROTECTIONS ON 
GERMAN AND UNITED STATES LAW 
Abstract: Privatization in the Czech Republic has opened the door to for-
eign investment. Investors, however, have been slow to invest in the Czech 
Republic because of its relatively weak shareholder protections. This Note 
analyzes the shareholder protections in the Czech Republic and suggests 
changes to the Czech Commercial Code based on German and United States 
protections for minority shareholders. Implementation of broader share-
holder protections will perhaps increase confidence in the Czech Republic 
and stimulate foreign investment. 
INTRODUCTION 
Investors face different legal protections depending on the state l 
in which they make an investment.2 As each decision to invest requires 
a careful assessment of the risks involved, the protections afforded to 
investors-one way in which risk may be minimized-may influence 
where an investor chooses to invest.3 With increases in global invest-
ing4 and increases in the demand for investment in emerging econo-
1 By "states," I I"efer not to the 50 political entities that comprise the United States, but 
rather the political entities that are equivalent to "nations" or "countries." See COVEY T. 
OLIVER ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 82 (4th eel. 1995). 
2 See infra notes 77-86, 101-05, 141, 171-72, 179 and accompanying text (discussing 
minority shareholder protections in the Czech Republic, Gennany, and the United States). 
3 See Terence L. Blackburn, The Unification of C01porate Laws: The United States, the EuTO-
pean Community and the Race to Laxity, 3 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REv. 1,17-18 (1994); Wil-
liam C. Philbrick, The Paving of "'flll Street in Eastern EurojJe: Establishing the Legal Infi-astruc-
ture for Stock Markets in the Formerly Centrally Planned Economies, 25 LAW & POL'y INT'L Bus. 
565,565-66 (1994). 
4 See Hendrick F. Jordaan, A Comparative AnaZ~sis of C01porate Fiduciary Law: lthy Dela-
ware Should Look Beyond the United States in Formulating a Standard of Care, 31 INT'L LAW. 133, 
133 (1997); Philbl"ick, supra note 3, at 565-66. "Global investing," as used in this article, 
refers to movements of capital either to foreign or multinational companies or to foreign 
countries. See Mary E. Kissane, Global Gadflies: AjJplications and Implementations of U.S.-Sty/c 
C01porate Governance Abroad, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 621, 621 (1997); Patrick 
Speeckaert, C01porate Governance in EurQjJe, 2 FORDHAM FIN. SEC. & TAX L.F. 31, 39 (1997). 
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mies,5 the differences among state investor protections may play a 
greater role in the analysis of investment risks.6 
The recent privatizations in many of the former communist states 
of East and Central Europe provide opportunities to examine the de-
velopment of investor protections and the effect such protections 
have on investor decisions.7 Emerging economies often look to their 
Western counterparts for investment and guidance.8 At the same time, 
Western investors are increasingly looking to emerging economies for 
investment opportunities.9 By examining investor protections in both 
emerging economies and developed economies, comparing those 
protections, and assessing their relative strengths and weaknesses, one 
may determine how emerging economies can create investment in-
centives by adopting stronger investment protections. lO 
Minority shareholders in close corporations,n a subset of the 
numerous categories of investors, have received protections based on 
duties owed by other shareholders.I2 These investors-owning only a 
5 See Kissane, supra note 4, at 621; Philbrick, supra note 3, at 565-67; Speeckaert, supra 
note 4, at 39-. "Emerging economies," as used in this article, refers to those states that have 
recently been making the transition from planned economies to market economies. See 
Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enfarcing Motkl of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. 
REv. 1911, 1912-13 (1996). 
6 See Kissane, supra note 4, at 621; Philbrick, supra note 3, at 590. 
7 See infra notes 44-64, 77-86 and accompanying text (discussing privatizations in the 
Czech Republic and the development of investor protections). 
8 SeeJosef Bejcek, The New Commercial Code of the Czech Republic, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 
699,706 (1997); Kissane, supra note 4, at 674; Philbrick, supra note 3, at 593; Sergio Salani 
& Jerry Sloan, An Overview of Legal and Financing Aspects for Doing Business in Hungary, Po-
land, and the Czech Republic, 9 TEMP. INT'L & COMPo LJ. 27, 28-29, 53 (1995); Speeckaert, 
supra note 4, at 38. For example, in 1992, Kmart purchased several department stores in 
the Czech Republic (at that time part of Czechoslovakia). See Robert C. Toth, Kmart Buys 
Up a Dozen Department Stares in Czechoslovakia, L.A. TIMES, May 8, 1992, at 12. In addition to 
purchasing the stores, Kmart planned to introduce retailing, technology, and distribution 
know-how to the Czech Republic. See id. 
9 SeeJordaan, supra note 4, at 134. 
10 See infra notes 324-38 and accompanying text (discussing suggestions for improving 
investor protections in the Czech Republic based on German and U.S. protections). 
11 For a definition of a close corporation, see infra note 134 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 77-86,101-05,141,171-72,179 and accompanying text (outlining 
minority shareholder protections in the close corporation context). It is important to note 
that while investors may derive protection from duties owed by corporate directors, direc-
tors in a close corporation, in many cases, are also shareholders. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd 
Electrotype, 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass. 1975). A full discussion of director duties, how-
ever, falls beyond the scope of this Note. The protections based on duties owed by other 
shareholders shall be referred to generally as "minority shareholder protections" for the 
remainder of this Note. 
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small, illiquid interest in a business entityI3-generally do not have 
the ability to control business decisions. I4 As this lack of control cre-
ates additional investment risks, minority shareholders are systemati-
cally more vulnerable than other investors.I5 This systematic disadvan-
tage has prompted several states to adopt specific protections for 
minority shareholders.I6 
The Czech Republic, one of the biggest success stories in Eastern 
Europe,17 currently seeks to reestablish itself as a highly developed 
state. IS To accomplish this goal, the Czech Republic has taken several 
steps to make its business atmosphere more inviting to the Western 
business community.19 Although the Czech Republic has a skilled, in-
expensive workforce,20 a strong industrial base,21 an excellent infra-
structure,22 a democratic tradition,23 and proximity to both E.astern 
and Western markets,24 the Czech Republic still lacks the high degree 
of foreign investment found in Poland and Hungary.25 In order to 
13 See Sandra K Miller, Min01ity Shareholder Oppression in the Plillate Company in the Euro-
pean Community: A Comparatille Analysis of the German, United Kingdom, and French "Close Cur-
poration Plvblem, "30 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 381,382 (1997). 
14 See Adam Chernichaw, Note, oppressed Shareholders in Close Corporations: A Market-
Oriented Statutor.y Remedy, 16 CARDOZO L. REv. 501, 507-08 (1994). 
15 See Miller, supra note 13, at 382; Charles W. Murdock, The Evolution of Effective Reme-
dies for Minority Shareholders and Its Impact Upon Valuation of Minority Shnres, 65 NOTRE DAME 
L. REv. 425, 426 (1990). 
16 See infra notes 77-86, 101-05, 141, 171-72, 179 and accompanying text (discussing 
how the Czech Republic, Germany, and the United States have responded to minority 
shareholder concerns). 
17 See Bejcek, supra note 8, at 707; Richard Pivnicka & Mark Kreisl, Czech Republic: In-
vestment in Freedom and the Future, 1 INT'L DIMENSIONS 6, 8 (1997). 
18 See Pivnicka & Kreisl, supra note 17, at 6. Prior to World War II, the Czech Republic 
(then part of Czechoslovakia) was the sixth wealthiest and one of the ten largest industrial-
ized countries in the world. See Bejcek, supra note 8, at 699; Frederick Kempe & Cacilie 
Rohwedder, Top Executives Name Czech Republic Most Attractive for Future Investments, WALL ST. 
j.,July 9,1993, at A6. 
19 See Salani & Sloan, supra note 8, at 28-29, 53. 
20 See Henry W. Lavine et a!., Czech and Slovak Plivatization: Issues and Approaches for 
Western Investors, in JOINT VENTURES AND OTHER FINANCING TECHNIQUES IN POLAND, 
HUNGARY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND ROMANIA 61, 66 (1992); Pivnicka & Kreisl, supra note 17, 
at 6; Salani & Sloan, supra note 8, at 29; Kempe & Rohwedder, supra note 18, at A6. 
21 See id. 
22 SeeSalani & Sloan, supra note 8, at 29. 
23 See Pivnicka & Kreisl, supra note 17, at 6; Kempe & Rohwedder, supra note 18, at A6. 
24 See Lavine et a!., supra note 20, at 67; Pivnicka & Kreisl, supra note 17, at 6; Kempe & 
Rohwedder, supra note 18, at A6. 
25 See Medicine for the Czech Stock Market, E./W. EXECUTIVE GUIDE, Feb. 1, 1997 [herein-
after Medicine]. 
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stabilize its stock market and continue developing its free market 
economy, the Czech Republic needs to rely on foreign participation.26 
This Note examines the comparative protections for minority 
shareholders in close corporations as promulgated by the Czech Re-
public, Germany, and the United States in order to understand how 
the Czech Republic may better protect minority shareholders and at-
tract foreign investors. Although a full discussion of the usefulness of 
a comparison of Czech law to German and U.S. law follows in Part IV, 
it is important to note initially that the Czech Republic has already 
looked to Germany and the United States as models for some of its 
own laws, and any changes in Czech investment laws will affect Ger-
many and the United States to some extent because the bulk of for-
eign investment comes from Germany and the United States. Part I 
discusses the transition to a market economy in the Czech Republic, 
forms of legal business entities in the Czech Republic, and statutory 
protections for minority shareholders recently enacted by the Czech 
Republic. This Part also discusses the structure of close corporations 
and minority shareholder protections in both Germany and the 
United States. Part II presents the investment issues unique to minor-
ity shareholders in close corporations. Part III undertakes a compara-
tive analysis of the minority shareholder protections in the three states 
examined. Part IV suggests that in order to improve minority share-
holder protections in the Czech Republic, the Czech Republic should 
adopt an amendment to the Commercial Code that will provide 
greater access to buyout remedies. This Note concludes that by emu-
lating German and U.S. minority shareholder protections, the Czech 
Republic can develop a system of protection that is more enticing to 
foreign investors, maintain economic stability, and foster market 
growth. 
26 See Philbrick, supra note 3, at 593. Due to the insufficiency of domestic savings, East-
ern European stock markets need to look to foreign sources of investment in order to 
maintain adequate capitalization. See id. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Czech &public 
1. History of Czech Commercial Practice 
The Austrian Commercial Code of 1863 governed business prac-
tice in Czechoslovakia27 until World War II.28 Czechoslovakia 
flourished during the time before World War II, ranking as one of the 
world's most developed economies.29 The communists, following their 
takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1948, replaced the Austrian Commer-
cial Code of 1863 with a nationalization scheme that eviscerated pri-
vate enterprise.30 Under the communist regime, the Civil Code, the 
Economic Code, and the Code of International Trade, were devel-
oped.31 
On December 29, 1989, the collapse of communism in Czecho-
slovakia ushered in an era fraught with economic, social, and political 
change.32 Following this collapse, Czechoslovakia faced the difficult 
task of determining how it would approach its goal of economic and 
political liberalization.33 The mere shift in political power and the in-
troduction of a market economy were insufficient.34 In order to com-
plete this transformation, Czechoslovak law had to restore private 
property rights, privatize state-owned businesses, and both stabilize 
and reduce inflation.35 Communist law severely limited the accom-
plishment of these goals.36 
27 Czechoslovakia peacefully split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia on January 1, 
1993. See Tami Pickerell Carroll, Giving Banks a Blank Czech: An Emerging Eastern European 
Corporate Governance Model, 7 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 25, 26 (1995). 
28 See Bejcek, supra note 8, at 702. 
29 See The New Bohemians: The Czech Republic, ECONOMIST, Oct. 22. 1994, at 23 [hereinaf-
ter The New Bohemians]. 
30 See Bejcek, supra note 8, at 702; The New Bohemians, supra note 29, at 23. 
31 See Bejcek, supra note 8, at 701. The Civil Code regulated relations between citizens 
and "socialist organizations"; the Economic Code set forth the laws for the management 
and governance of these "socialist organizations"; and the Code of International Trade 
governed relations with foreign business partners. See id. at 702, 705. The government 
determined whether an organization qualified as a "socialist organization" in rathel' ideo-
logical and arbitrary manners. See id. at 702. 
32 See Pivnicka & Kreisl, supra note 17, at 6. 
33 See Carroll, supra note 27, at 25-26. 
34 See Bejcek, supra note 8, at 706. 
35 See Karel Fiala & Filip Hruska, Current Financial and Investment EmJimnment in the 
Czech Republic, 49 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REp. 296, 296 (1995). 
36 See Bejcek, supra note 8, at 707. 
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On January 1, 1992, the Commercial Code replaced the three 
codes promulgated by the communist regime.37 The Commercial 
Code was passed in order to stabilize the economy, facilitate business, 
and encourage investment in the emerging economy.38 The Commer-
cial Code governs all organized business activities except for activities 
of state enterprises.39 The Commercial Code, according to its text, was 
also designed to harmonize Czechoslovak law with the law of other 
European countries.40 
The Czechs and Slovaks could not agree, inter alia, on the pace of 
liberalization, and the two entities peacefully split on January 1, 
1993.41 Upon the split of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, all federal laws continued to be in effect for each state.42 
Therefore, the Commercial Code, although enacted while the Czech 
Republic was part of Czechoslovakia, remained law in the Czech Re-
public.43 
2. Privatization 
Throughout Central and Eastern Europe, the trend for former 
communist states has been to develop privatization schemes.44 Privati-
zation is the transferal of ownership of state-owned enterprises to pri-
vate parties.45 The goal of privatization is to promote economic 
efficiency by removing state controls and allowing more competitive 
producers to respond to market demands.46 
The Czech Republic, pursuing a faster pace of economic liberali-
zation than its Slovak counterpart, has sought rapid privatization of its 
state-owned enterprises.47 The Czech Republic's privatization plan has 
37 See Salani & Sloan, supra note 8, at 45. The Commercial Code was codified in Act 
No. 513/1991 Sbirka zakon (Collection of Laws), cited in Bejcek, supra note 8, at 700 n.3. 
38 See Sarah Andrus, The Czech Republic and Slovakia: Foreign Participation in Changing 
Economies, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 6Il, 620, 631 (1994); Bejcek, supra note 8, 
at 705, 708. 
39 See Carroll, supra note 27, at 28. 
40 See Andrus, supra note 38, at 620. 
41 See Carroll, supra note 27, at 26; Fiala & Hruska, supra note 35, at 296. 
42 See Carroll, supra note 27, at 27; Fiala & Hruska, supra note 35, at 296. 
43 See Andrus, supra note 38, at 620-21; Bejcek, supra note 8, at 700; Fiala & Hruska, 
supra note 35, at 296. 
44 See John Regis Coogan et aI., international Legal Developments in Review: J996-Central 
European Law, 31 INT'L LAW. 495, 495 (1997). 
45 See Carroll, supra note 27, at 29; Philbrick, supra note 3, at 577. 
46 See Michele Balfour & Cameron Crise, A Privatization Test: The Czech Republic, Slovakia 
and Poland, 17 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 84, 85 (1993). 
47 See Carroll, supra note 27, at 26. 
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served as a model for other East and Central European countries 
seeking to establish market economies.48 
The Czech Republic accomplished its privatization goals through 
two different privatization laws.49 First, the Small Privatization Law was 
designed to facilitate the transfer of small state-run business to private 
owners.50 These businesses were sold through public auctions.51 The 
privatization of over 10,000 small businesses52 was completed in 
1993.53 Second, the Large Privatization Law facilitated the transfer of 
large enterprises to private owners.54 In order to qualify under the 
Large Privatization Law, businesses had to submit privatization plans 
to the Ministry of Finance for approval.55 Although large businesses 
could be privatized through a direct sale,56 privatization for most large 
businesses was effectuated by the coupon privatization process.57 
In May 1992, the Czech Republic (at that time still a part of 
Czechoslovakia58), initiated the world's first mass privatization plan59 
when it transferred about US$10 billion of property to the public 
through a coupon privatization scheme.60 The second round of cou-
pon privatization, beginning on October 1, 1993,61 resulted in an ag-
48 See Richard L. Holman, Czech Sell-Off Round Ends, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 1994, at A14. 
For example, Russia modeled its privatization on the Czechoslovak plans. See Philbrick, 
supra note 3, at 581-82; Toth, supra note 8, at 12. 
49 See Balfour & Crise, supra note 46, at 93-94; Philbrick, supra note 3, at 580. 
50 See Law No. 427 of 15 October 1990, the Act on the Transfer of the State Ownership 
of Some Property to Other Juridicial or Natural Persons, cited in Philbrick, supra note 3, at 
580 n.77; Salani & Sloan, supra note 8, at 47. 
51 See Lavine et aI., supra note 20, app. at 87. 
52 See Balfour & Crise, supra note 46, at 93. 
53 See Andrus, supra note 38, at 615. 
54 See Law No. 92 of 26 February 1991, the Act on Conditions of Transferring State 
Property to Other Persons, cited in Philbrick, supra note 3, at 580 n.78; Andrus, supra note 
38, at 615. 
55 See Andrus, supra note 38, at 615-16. 
56 See id. at 616. 
57 See Balfour & Crise, supra note 46, at 94. Coupon privatization (also called voucher 
privatization), involved the purchase of investment coupons by Czech citizens. See Andrus, 
supra note 38, at 616; Balfour & Crise, supra note 46, at 86. Each citizen over the age of 18 
was permitted to pUl"Chase a booklet of coupons. See Carroll, supra note 27, at 30. These 
coupons could then be used to purchase shares in joint stock companies or investment 
funds. See id. 
58 See Balfour & Crise, supra note 46, at 95. The fi1'st round of privatization was a joint 
effort between the two entities that would eventually become the Czech Republic and Slo-
vakia. See id. 
59 See Carroll, supra note 27, at 29. 
60 See Balfour & Crise, supra note 46, at 95. 
61 See Richard L. Hobnan, More Czech Prillatizations Set, WALL ST. J., July 21, 1993, at 
All. 
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gregate transfer of 80% of the state's assets to the public.62 According 
to Tomas Jezek, Chairman of the Czech Stock Exchange Chamber, 
the total privatization by 1997 amounted to 90% of formerly state-
owned assets, with 60% of Czech citizens63 participating in the privati-
zation.64 
3. Structure of Legal Business Entities 
The four legal business entities established by the Commercial 
Code are the limited liability company (spolecnost s rucenim omezenjm) , 
joint stock company (akciova spolecnost), general partnership (verejna 
obchodni spolecnost), and limited partnership (komanditni spolecnost na 
akcie).65 The limited liability company and the joint stock company are 
the two most common business entities.66 
In a limited liability company, a shareholder is only liable for any 
unpaid capital.67 Each shareholder must invest at least 20,000 Czech 
crowns (KC),68 and the number of shareholders is limited to fifty.69 
The minimum capitalization requirement for a limited liability com-
pany is 100,000 Kc.70 A shareholder in a limited liability company may 
not withdraw from the company, but the shareholder may be expelled 
by the other shareholders.71 Limited liability companies have a 
flexible management structure-management may be effectuated 
however the shareholders determine.72 
For a joint stock company, the major requirement is a net capi-
talization of one million Kc.73 A shareholder is not personally liable 
for any of the company's obligations.74 Joint stock companies must 
have a supervisory board.75 Shareholders may pass resolutions with a 
62 See Holman, supra note 48, at A14. 
63 See Medicine, supra note 25. According to another estimate, however, approximately 
80% of Czech citizens purchased shares. See Bejcek, supra note 8, at 707 n.36. 
64 See Medicine, supra note 25. 
65 See Salani & Sloan, supra note 8, at 45. 
66 See Fiala & Hruska, supra note 35, at 297. 
67 See Pivnicka & Kreisl, supra note 17, at 6; Salani & Sloan, supra note 8, at 45. 
68 As of Tlnirsday, April 1, 1999, one United States dollar would purchase 35.788 
Czech crowns (Kuruna). See Currency Trading-Exchange Rates, WALL ST.]., Apr. 1, 1999, at 
Cll. 
69 See Fiala & Hruska, supra note 35, at 297. 
70 See id. 
71 See Andrus, supra note 38, at 623 & n.100. 
72 SeeSalani & Sloan, supra note 8, at 45. 
73 See Fiala & Hruska, supra note 35, at 297; Pivnicka & Kreisl, supra note 17, at 7. 
74 See Pivnicka & Kreisl, supra note 17, at 7. 
75 SeeSalani & Sloan, supra note 8, at 45. 
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simple majority vote if a quorum of 30% of the shareholders are pres-
ent.76 
4. Minority Shareholder Protections 
In 1996, the Czech government introduced amendments to the 
Commercial Code that were designed to provide minority share-
holder protections.77 These amendments were also intended to afford 
protections similar to other European countries.78 Effective July 1, 
1996, these amendments introduced strict buyout rules in takeovers.79 
At any time a takeover occurs, the person effectuating the takeover 
must offer to purchase the shares of the remaining shareholders for 
the average market price of those shares.8o This buyout remedy now 
affords minority shareholders an opportunity to exit the corpora-
tion.81 Furthermore, the amendments create limitations on minority 
shareholder squeeze-outs.82 Prior to the amendments, minority 
76 See Andrus, supra note 38, at 625. 
77 See Act No. 142/1996 Sbirka zakon (Collection of Laws) Amending the Commercial 
Code and the Civil Code, cited in Coogan et ai., supra note 44, at 499; Legiswtive Changes 
Will Bling Greater Transparency and Shareholder Protection to Czech CalJital Market, E./W. Ex-
ECUTIVE GUIDE, July 1, 1996 [hereinafter Legislative Changes]. Foreign investors are equally 
protected by the amendment because the Commercial Code provides that all foreign in-
vestors may conduct business under the same conditions as Czech investors. See Fiala & 
Hruska, supra note 35, at 297. 
78 See Medicine, supra note 25. These amendments were modeled on both European 
Union guidelines and German law. See Susan Tietjen, Recent Amendments to the Czech Com-
mercial Code and Securities Act, CENT. EUR. L. COMMITTEE NEWSL. (Am. Bar Ass'n Section of 
Int'l Law and Practice, Washington, D.C.), Summer 1996, at 2. It is important that the 
Czech Republic model its protections on those of other European states because it cur-
rently seeks admission into the European Union. Significantly, the European Union has 
proposed the adoption of stronger minority shareholder protections as a short-term objec-
tive fOl' accession. See Accession Partnership-Czech Republic-October 1999-Draft (visited 
Dec. 8, 1999) <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/ docs/index.htm> [hereinafter 
Accession Partnership]. For more specific examples of these similarities, compare infi"a 
notes 79-86 and accompanying text with Miller, supra note 13, at 393, 396, 403 (discussing 
buyout remedies in Germany and the United Kingdom). 
79 See Coogan et ai., supra note 44, at 499; Legislative Changes, sulml note 77. Any acqui-
sition by a person of more than one-half, two-thirds, or three-fOUl"ths of the aggregate 
nominal value of a company's voting shares constitutes a takeover. See Tietjen, supra note 
78, at 3. 
80 See Legislative Changes, supra note 77. The average market price for the purpose of 
the shareholder buyout is calculated according to the price of the stock over the previous 
six months. See id. Furthermore, in order to pI'event circumvention of the strict buyout 
requirement, the amendment considel's a "shareholder" to include any group acting in 
accord. See id. 
81 See Tietjen, supra note 78, at 3. 
82 See Coogan et ai., supra note 44, at 499; Tietjen, supra note 78, at 4. For a discussion 
of squeeze-outs, see infra notes 231-35 and accompanying text. 
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shareholders were subject to squeeze-outs when corporations can-
celed the ability to publicly trade shares or imposed restrictions on 
the transfer of shares.83 Due to this imposed lack of liquidity, minority 
shareholders were pressured to sell their shares on majority share-
holders' terms.84 The amendments now require shareholder votes to 
either cancel the public trade ability of shares or to impose limitations 
on the transferability of shares.85 If the corporation obtains share-
holder approval for either of these changes, it must offer to purchase 
the shares of all shareholders who did not vote for the change.86 
B. Germany 
1. Structure of Close Corporations-the GmbH 
The limited liability company (Gesellschaft mit beschriinkter Haftung 
or GmbH87) is the German form of business that meets the character-
istics of a close corporation.88 The GmbH is the most common busi-
ness entityB9 and is governed by the Gesetz betreJJend die Gesellschaften mit 
beschriinkter Haftung (GmbH Law).90 The minimum capitalization re-
quirement for a GmbH is 50,000 German Marks (DM).91 Each share-
holder in a GmbH must contribute at least 500 DM.92 
The GmbH has a flexible management structure.93 The GmbH 
need not create a supervisory board, and shareholders maintain ulti-
mate authority over business matters.94 The shares of a GmbH are 
83 See Tietjen, supra note 78, at 4. 
84 See id. 
85 See id. A majority vote of the shareholders (where each shareholder has one vote re-
gardless of how many shares he or she holds) and a three-fourths vote of those sharehold-
ers who will be affected by the change are required in order to cancel the public tradeabil-
ity of shares. See id. To limit the transferability of shares, a corporation must obtain a two-
thirds vote of the shareholders and a three-fourths vote of those shareholders who will be 
affected by the change. See id. 
86 See Tietjen, supra note 78, at 5. 
87 See Miller, supra note 13, at 394. 
88 See id. at 384, 395. 
89 See Hugh T. Scogin, Jr., Withdrawal and Expulsion in Germany: A Cornparative Perspective 
on the "Close Corporation Problem," 15 MICH.j. INT'L L. 127, 131 (1993). 
90 See id. at 134. 
'91 See Miller, supra note 13, at 395. As of Thursday, April 1, 1999, one United States dol-
lar was equivalent to 1.8126 DM. See Currency Trading-Exchange Rates, supra note 68, at 
Cll.-
92 See Miller, supra note 13, at 395. 
93 See id. at 394. 
94 See id. at 394-95. 
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relatively illiquid.95 Shares of a GmbH-referred to in German as 
"business interests" (Geschiiftsanteile)-may not be traded on the stock 
exchange.96 Transfer of shares must be effectuated by a notarial act.97 
As a result of this close-corporate structure, minority shareholders in a 
GmbH may be vulnerable to abuse by dominant shareholders.98 
2. Minority Shareholder Protections 
Although Germany is a civil law country, both statutory and judi-
cial remedies protect minority shareholders in a GmbH.99 These 
remedies provide minority shareholders with a means to regulate the 
conduct of majority shareholders.1°o Similar to traditional remedies in 
the United States, the German judiciary has been granted statutory 
authority to dissolve a GmbH.101 The grounds for dissolution in Ger-
many, however, are when a court concludes that a company can no 
longer accomplish its purposes or when it concludes that there are 
substantial causes (wichtige Grund) for dissolution.102 Two major down-
sides of dissolution, however, are the loss of the business and the loss 
ofjobs.103 
Beyond this statutory authority, the judiciary has developed two 
other highly discretionary remedies: withdrawal (Austritt) and expul-
sion (Ausschliej3ung) .104 Both of these remedies require the showing of 
95 See Scogin,Jr., supra note 89, at 133 n.20. 
96 See H. JUNG &J. GRES, STARTING BUSINESS OPERATIONS IN GERMANY 33 (1984), re-
printed in RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 954 (3d ed. 
1995). 
97 SeeScogin,Jr., supra note 89, at 133 n.20. 
98 See Miller, supra note 13, at 382. The vulnerability of the minority shareholders in a 
GmbH minors the vulnerability of minority shareholders in a U.S. dose corporation. See 
inji¥l notes 139-40, 217-21 and accompanying text. 
99 See Miller, supra note 13, at 392, 396. 
100 See id. at 396. 
101 See Scogin,Jr., supra note 89, at 134. 
102 See Miller, supra note 13, at 396. The Gezetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschriinkter 
Haftung (GmbH Law) grants the judiciary this authority in § 61 (1). See id. at 396 n.78; Sco-
gin,Jr., supra note 89, at 134-35. Section 61 of the GmbH Law provides that: "[tlhe com-
pany may be dissolved by a court decision in case it becomes impossible to accomplish the 
purpose of the company or when there are other substantial causes (wichtige Grund) for 
the dissolution resulting from the conditions of the company." Scogin, Jr., supra note 89, at 
134. 
103 See id. 
104 See id. at 135. 
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a wichtige Grund.105 Neither of these remedies may be waived or re-
stricted by the articles of incorporation.106 
Wichtige Grund in a withdrawal proceeding may be established 
through any of the following categories: personal characteristics of 
the departing shareholder, behavior of other shareholders, or the ex-
istence of special factors. 107 Significantly, neither fault nor exclusion 
from decision making are necessary to establish wichtige Grund,108 
thereby making wichtige Grund broader than U.S. notions of fiduciary 
duties.109 The underlying premise for granting a right of withdrawal is 
that an individual should not be forced to stay in a long term relation-
ship when the circumstances have "permanently and negatively 
changed. "110 Therefore, the breadth of wichtige Grund indicates that 
the withdrawal remedy will be widely available to minority sharehold-
ers. lll 
In order to effectuate withdrawal, the shareholder who wishes to 
depart must first give notice to the company.ll2 Next, the shareholder 
must obtain consent from the remaining shareholders.1l3 If the 
shareholder who wishes to withdraw does not receive consent from 
the remaining shareholders, the aggrieved shareholder may bring a 
court action seeking a withdrawal order.1l4 If a shareholder obtains a 
withdrawal right, either through consent or judicial order, that share-
holder may leave the company and obtain the fair market value of his 
or her shares.1l5 
105 See Miller, supra note 13, at 396. 
106 See Scogin, Jr., supra note 89, at 135. 
107 See Miller, supra note 13, at 397; Scogin, Jr., supra note 89, at 154-55. Scogin elabo-
rates on these three theories for withdrawal by providing concrete examples. See Scogin, 
Jr., supra note 89, at 155. Personal characteristics of the departing shareholder may include 
financial need, illness, relocation, and an inability to fulfill the shareholder role. See id. 
Behavior of other shareholders may encompass the arbitrary exercise of majority power or 
the continuation of a dispute among shareholders. See id. Finally, special factors may in-
clude a lack of long-term returns on a shareholder's investment or a change in the pur-
pose of the company. See id. 
108 See id. at 155. United States fiduciary duties, in contrast to the personal characteris-
tics that may constitute luichtige Grund, include such elements as disloyalty, self-dealing, 
oppression, and bad faith. SeeScogin,Jr., supra note 89, at 135. 
109 See id. 
llO Id. at 155. 
III See id. at 154. In fact, the withdrawal remedy is available to all shareholders. See id. 
112 SeeScogin,Jr., supra note 89, at 156. 
113 See id. 
114 See Miller, supra note 13, at 396. 
115 See id. 
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A shareholder's ability to withdraw from a company and obtain 
value for his or her interest in the company overcomes the illiquidity 
problem that faces minority shareholders in close corporations.1l6 On 
the other hand, a shareholder who withdraws still faces the loss of in-
volvement with the company and the loss of future earnings. ll7 In 
these respects, withdrawal rights closely resemble U.S. buyout reme-
dies.1l8 
The expulsion remedy permits an aggrieved shareholder to re-
move the problem (i.e., the shareholder sought to be expelled) with-
out losing his or her stake in the company.1l9 The ability to remove 
the problem without removing one's self from participation in the 
corporation presents a marked contrast to withdrawaP20 Expulsion, 
because it is unavailable in the United States, presents the largest con-
trast to U.S. remedies.l21 If expulsion is granted, the expelled share-
holder will be required to leave the company after being paid the fair 
market value of his or her interest in the GmbH.l22 The underlying 
premise for granting expulsion is that a majority position should not 
be carte blanche for a majority shareholder to do whatever he or she 
wants. 123 
Wichtige Grund in an expulsion action is narrower than in a with-
drawal action.124 The grounds for proving wichtige Grund in an expul-
sion action involve only the personal characteristics of the share-
holder in question and the conduct of that shareholder.l25 For 
116 SeeScogin.Jr., supra note 89, at 135. 
117 See id. 
118 See infra notes 257-58 and accompanying text. 
119 See Scogin, Jr., supra note 89, at 156. Expulsion, because it is available to any share-
holder who establishes lUichtige Grund, may, however, be used against a minority share-
holder. See Miller, supra note 13, at 399 (discussing how German remedies contrast with 
U.S. remedies because U.S. remedies are primarily geared toward minority shareholders). 
12Q See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
121 See MiJJer, supra note 13, at 399; Scogin,Jr., supra note 89, at 136. 
122 See Miller, supra note 13, at 396; Scogin,Jr., supra note 89, at 158. 
123 See Scogin, Jr., supra note 89, at 158. 
124 See id. at 160. The European Union has taken notice of the Czech capital markets 
system, as it has emphasized minority shareholder protections and the Securities and Ex-
change Commission in its most recent proposed Accession Partnership. See Accession 
Partnership, supra note 78. 
125 See Miller, supra note 13, at 397. But see supra note 107 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing lUichtige Grund in the withdrawal context). Personal charactel'istics may include 
such factors as age, iJJness, or mental incapacity. See Scogin, Jr., supra note 89, at 160. 
Shareholder conduct may include such acts as breaching the trust of other shareholders, 
financial mismanagement, causing conflicts among shareholders, and making improper 
sexual advances. See id. 
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example, in a 1953 decision, the German court considered the de-
fendant's commission of adultery to be a relevant factor in granting 
expulsion.126 In that case, the court also considered the defendant's 
mismanagement of funds and unauthorized purchases as factors con-
tributing to a finding of wichtige Grund. 127 
The procedure for expelling a shareholder first begins with a 
vote by the shareholders,128 The shareholder in question, however, 
may not vote on the matter. l29 This voting procedure makes it possible 
for a minority shareholder to vote to expel a majority shareholder.130 
If the requisite majority of the vote is achieved, the court must order 
the expulsion as long as it is satisfied that there is a wichtige Grund.l3l 
The expelled shareholder then must be paid the value of his or her 
holding.132 
C. United States 
1. Close Corporations 
Close corporations, the most common form of business entity in 
the United States,133 generally have a small number of shareholders 
and no ready market for their shares.134 In addition, shareholders in 
close corporations often participate in management,135 Close corpora-
tions-often viewed as intimate relationships136-are usually formed 
126 See Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen (Supreme Court) deci-
sion of April 1, 1953, BGHZ 9, 157 [hereinafter April 1, 1953 Decision], cited in Miller, 
supra note 13, at 398 & n.90. 
127 See id. 
128 See Scogin , jr. , supra note 89, at 157. 
129 See id. 
130 See id. at 136,157. In its decision of April 1, 1953, the German court held explicitly 
that a minority shareholder can expel a majority shareholder if wichtige Grund is estab-
lished. See April 1, 1953 Decision, cited in Scogin,jr., supra note 89, at 157 & n.123. 
131 See Scogin, jr. , supra note 89, at 157. The general trend is to require a supermajority 
vote for expulsion. See id. Some commentators, however, argue that only a simple majority 
should be required. See id. 
132 See id. at 158. 
133 SeeChernichaw, supra note 14, at 501; Miller, supra note 13, at 383. 
134 See M. Thomas Arnold, Shareholder Duties Under State Law, 28 TULSA LJ. 213, 240 
(1992). In Donahue lI. Rodd Electrotype Co., the Supreme judicial Court of Massachusetts 
defined a close corporation as having "(1) a small number of stockholders; (2) no ready 
market for the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority stockholder participation in 
the management, direction and operations of the corporation." 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 
(Mass. 1975). 
135 See Arnold, supra note 134, at 240 n.205; Chernichaw, supra note 14, at 507. 
136 See Arnold, supra note 134, at 234; Chernichaw, supra note 14, at 507 .. 
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by family members and friends. 137 Approximately 95% of close corpo-
rations are family-owned. 138 
In close corporations, the minority shareholders often become 
employees and rely on their salaries as their return on investment.139 
As the majority may control compensation and employment deci-
sions, not only is the minority shareholder vulnerable to losing his or 
her investment, but the minority shareholder is often at risk of losing 
his or her job.140 
2. Minority Shareholder Protections 
a. Dissolution and Its Progeny 
The traditional remedy for minority shareholders has been to 
seek dissolution of the corporation.141 Dissolution involves the wind-
ing up of corporate affairs, selling the corporation's assets, paying off 
corporate debt, and distributing the remaining capital to sharehold-
ers on a pro rata basis.142 Although viewed as a rather drastic remedy, 
dissolution is the most common form of relief granted to minority 
shareholders by state legislatures.143 As is precisely the case in Ger-
many, dissolution in the United States is also drastic because the cor-
poration is extinguished, along with any hope of future profits. l44 
Although several grounds for dissolution have been advanced by 
legislatures, the most common basis for dissolution has been a minor-
ity shareholder's claim of oppression.145 Despite adoption of the term 
137 See Arnold, supra note 134, at 234; Miller, supra note 13, at 383. 
138 SeeChemichaw, supra note 14, at 501. 
139 See Arnold, supra note 134, at 234. A guarantee of employment may he one of the 
major reasons why a minority shareholder dlOoses to invest in a dose corporation. See 
Murdock, supra note 15, at 435. 
140 See Murdock, supra note 15, at 435. 
141 SeeScogin,Jr., supra note 89, at 129-30. 
142 SeeChernichaw, supra note 14, at 517-18. 
143 See Murdock, supra note 15, at 453. 
144 See id. at 426, 441; Scogin,Jr., supra note 89, at 130. 
145 See Murdock, supra note 15, at 455. For example, the Revised Model Business Cor-
poration Act provides for dissolution upon (i) director deadlock, (ii) oppression, (iii) 
shareholder deadlock, or (iv) waste. REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 14.30(2), reprinted 
in CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: STATUTES, RULES, MATERIALS, AND FORMS 
480,660-61 (Melvin Aron Eisenberg ed., 1998) [hereinafter CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS 
ASSOCIATIONS]. 
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"oppression" by a number of jurisdictions, courts have varied with re-
gard to what conduct they will deem to be oppressive. I46 
Until the 1980s, Illinois led the United States in developing the 
contours of oppression.147 The 1933 Illinois Business Corporation Act 
first introduced oppression as a basis for liquidation.148 Beginning 
with Central Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois held that oppression did not require a finding of fraud or illegal 
conduct. I49 Illinois courts have held that heavy-handed and arbitrary 
conduct on the part of another shareholder will constitute oppression 
for the purpose of dissolution. I50 Some examples of this conduct in-
clude exclusion from control and participation in corporate affairs,I51 
misuse of corporate funds or assets,I52 and failure to pay dividends. I53 
Several jurisdictions have followed the lead of Illinois decisions in 
recognizing broad bases for oppression. I54 
After the 1980s, New York led the way in developing the reason-
able expectations test in order to determine whether there has been 
oppressive conduct.I55 This development in the New York courts fol-
146 See Murdock, supra note 15, at 426, 455-61. Courts have addressed the issue of op-
pressive conduct in several cases, with varying results. See, e.g., Capitol Toyota, Inc. v. Ber-
vin, 381 So.2d 1038, 1039 (Miss. 1980) (finding no oppression where "reasonable expecta-
tions have been thwarted, but not grossly so"); Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 
507 P.2d 387, 394 (Or. 1973) (finding a close tie between oppression and the fiduciary 
duty of good faith and fair dealing); White v. Perkins, 189 S.E.2d 315, 320 (Va. 1972) 
(finding oppression to constitue "a visible departure from the standards of fair dealing"); 
Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 170 N.E.2d 131, 138 (Ill. 1960) (finding oppression 
where corporation's president acted "in an arbitrary and high-handed manner"); Fix v. Fix 
Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 358 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (finding that although oppression 
is closely tied to fiduciary duties, a single breach of fiduciary duty will not constitute op-
pression unless extremely serious or causes "iITeparable injury, imminent danger of loss or 
miscardage of justice"). 
147 See Murdock, supra note 15, at 455. 
148 See id. at 455 & n.199. This Act was the basis for the Revised Model Business Corpo-
ration Act. See id. at 455. 
149 See 141 N.E.2d 45, 50 (Ill. 1957); see also Gidwitz, 170 N.E.2d at 138 (where the Su-
preme Court of Illinois held that "[il t is not necessary that fraud, illegality or even loss be 
shown"). 
150 See Gidwitz, 170 N.E.2d at 138; Notzke v. Art Gallery, Inc., 405 N.E.2d 839, 843 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1980); Compton v. Paul K. Harding Realty Co., 285 N.E.2d 574, 581 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1972) . 
151 See Gidwitz, 170 N.E.2d at 135; Compton, 285 N.E.2d at 581. 
152 See Ross v. 311 North Central Ave. Bldg. Corp., 264 N.E.2d 406, 409 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1970); Murdock, supra note 15, at 457. 
153 See Gray v. Hall, 295 N.E.2d 506, 509 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973). 
154 See generally Murdock, supra note 15, at 457-61 (discussing the development of op-
pression in other United States jurisdictions). 
155 See id. at 454, 465. A New Jersey decision, however, first introduced the standard of 
reasonable expectations as a means by which a court could find oppression. See Exadaktilos 
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lowed 1979 legislation providing a buyout remedy as an alternative to 
dissolution. 156 
In re Topper, the first New York case to articulate the reasonable 
expectations standard, involved a one-third shareholder of two phar-
macies who sought either dissolution or a buyout.157 Topper, the mi-
nority shareholder seeking judicial relief, put his life savings into the 
pharmacies, gave up a job in the drug business that he had held for 
twenty-five years, and moved his family from Florida to New York in. 
order to participate in the business.158 Although Topper's salary was 
raised from $30,000 to $75,000 during the time that he was involved 
with the businesses, Topper was fired after one year and was removed 
as an officer.159 In finding oppressive conduct, the New York court 
held that "the respondents' actions ... severely damaged [Topper's] 
reasonable expectations. "160 "These reasonable expectations," the 
court continued, "constitute the bargain of the parties in light of 
which subsequent conduct must be appraised. "161 
Under New York law, the "bargain of the parties" does not neces-
sarily mean the agreement (explicit or implied) among the founders 
of a corporation.162 Therefore, reasonable expectations may encom-
pass expectations generated by subsequent events,163 shareholders 
who join the corporation after its foundation,164 or shareholders who 
are generations removed from the founders.165 
v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554, 561-62 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979), a/I'd 414 A.2d 
994 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) (finding, however, that plaintiff's expectations were not 
frustrated by defendants); Murdock, supra note 15, at 461. 
156 See N.V. Bus. CORP. L. § II04-a, reprinted in CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ASSOCIA-
TIONS, supra note 145, at 788, 860-61; Murdock, supra note 15, at 461. 
157 433 N.YS.2d 359, 361 (Sup. Ct. 1980). 
158 Id. at 361-62. 
159Id. 
160 Id. at 362. See also In re Taines, 444 N .YS.2d 540, 544 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (finding frus-
tration of a shareholder's reasonable expectations on similar facts). 
161 In re Topper, 433 N.YS.2d at 365 (finding that these reasonable expectations in-
dude participating in management and receiving salary from employment with the busi-
ness). New York courts have also held that the expectation of fair dealing on the part of 
other shareholders is a reasonable expectation. See Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.YS.2d 1014, 
1020 (Sup. Ct. 1984). 
162 See generally O'Donnei v. Marine Repair Sen-s., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 1199 (S.D.N.Y 
1982) (where plaintiff became a shareholder after the cOl'poration was formed); Gimpel, 
477 N.YS.2d 1014 (where parties were generations removed from the founding of the 
corporation) . 
163 See In reTopper, 433 N.YS.2d at 365. 
164 See O'Donnel, 530 F. Supp. at 1207. 
165 See Gimpel, 477 N.YS.2d at 1016. 
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The Court of Appeals of New York in In re Kemp & Beatiey, Inc. 
further clarified the standard for finding oppression by holding that 
the expectations of an aggrieved shareholder must be both objectively 
reasonable and central to the decision to enter into the business ven-
ture. 166 After finding that the corporation awarded de facto dividends 
to all shareholders except the minority shareholders, thereby prevent-
ing the minority shareholders from receiving a return on their in-
vestments, the court found that there was oppressive conduct on the 
part of the majority shareholders.167 
The reasonable expectations test for finding oppression has been 
widely used in a different remedial context-judicially supervised 
buyouts.168 As dissolution is viewed as a drastic remedy,169 courts and 
legislatures have created remedies for oppressed minority sharehold-
ers that fall short of requiring the extinction of the corporation.170 
Examples of alternative remedies generally include judicial action by 
means of an injunction or order, appointment of provisional directors 
or custodians, and buyouts. l7l Buyouts, however, have been the focus 
of alternative relief.172 
A buyout occurs when a court orders a corporation to purchase a 
minority shareholder's interest. 173 Although this permits a minority 
shareholder to overcome the problem of illiquidity, receive some re-
turn on his or her investment, and exit the corporation, courts have 
struggled with how to determine the value of the minority share-
holder's interest.174 Several complications include determining the 
method for valuation,175 assessing whether to discount the value be-
cause it is a minority interest,176 considering whether to discount the 
166 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984). See also Chernichaw, supra note 14, at 514. 
167 In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d at 1175-76. 
168 See Murdock, supra note 15, at 461. 
169 See id. at 426. 
170 See id. at 427-28; Robert B. Thompson, Cmporate Dissolution and Share-holders' Rea-
sonable Expectations, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 193, 228-32 (1988). 
171 See Thompson, supm note 170, at 228-32. 
172 See Murdock, supra note 15, at 464, 470; Thompson, supm note 170, at 228-29. 
Courts have approved buyouts in several cases. See Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 388 
(N.D. 1987); McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232, 235-36 (N.M. 1986); 
Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443, 446 (Alaska 1985); Sauer v. Moffitt, 363 N.W.2d 269, 275 
(Iowa 1984); Maddox v. Norman, 669 P.2d 230, 238 (Mont. 1983); Baker v. Commercial 
Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387, 396 (Or. 1973); Davis v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375, 380 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1988). 
173 See Thompson, supra note 170, at 228-29. 
174 See Murdock, supm note 15, at 470-71; Thompson, supm note 170, at 232. 
175 See Murdock, supm note 15, at 473. 
176 See Thompson, supm note 170, at 233. 
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value because of the lack of a market,177 and calculating to what ex-
tent, if any, an adjustment should be made for the oppressive con-
duct. I78 
b. Fiduciary Duties of Good Faith and Loyalty 
An alternative to granting remedies for minority shareholder op-
pression has been to award remedies on a theory of fiduciary duties 
owed to shareholders.I79 Following the leading Massachusetts case, 
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., several jurisdictions have fashioned 
similar standards. I80 Some examples of conduct that have been found 
to violate fiduciary duties are: selective repurchases by the corpora-
tion of its shares, terminating a shareholder/ employee's employment, 
violating share redemption agreements, issuing shares to change the 
relative control of the shareholders, and causing the corporation to 
favor a shareholder's company in discharging debt.I81 Although im-
posing fiduciary duties is a clear trend in U.S. case law,I82 imposing 
these duties may not necessarily allow a minority shareholder to re-
cover his or her investment and exit the company.I83 
Fiduciary duties-the obligations of good faith and loyalty-de-
rive from the context of partnerships.184 Close corporations resemble 
partnerships because the business relationships in both are character-
177 See id. at 234. 
178 See Murdock, supra note 15, at 473. Particularly if the oppressive conduct involves a 
waste of assets or excessive compensation, a minority shareholder may want the valuation 
to take into account what the shares would have been worth had the waste not occulTed. 
See id. 
179 See Arnold, supra note 134, at 234; Murdock, supra note 15, at 426-27. 
180 See Arnold, supra note 134, at 234, 237-38; Michael R. Pontrelli & John T. Mont-
gomery, Close Corporations and the Duty oj Utmost Good Faith and Loyalty, in MASSACHUSETTS 
CORPORATION LAw AND PRACTICE 507, 510 (Richard W. Southgate & Donald W. Glazer 
eds., 1998). Several state court decisions have followed the Donahue doctrine. See Daniels v. 
Thomas, Dean & Hoskins, Inc., 804 P.2d 359, 366 (Mont. 1990); Fought v. Morris, 543 
So.2d 167, 171 (Miss. 1989); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 387-88 (N.D. 1987); 
Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 276 (Alaska 1980); Hagshenas v. Gaylord, 
572 N.E.2d 316,323 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Sundberg v. Lampert Lumber Co., 390 N.W.2d 
352,355-56 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Estate of Schroer v. StanlCo Supply Inc., 482 N.E.2d 
975,981 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); 68th Street Apts., Inc. v. Lauricella, 362 A.2d 78, 86 (NJ. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976). 
181 See Arnold, supra note 134, at 237-38. 
182 See id. at 234. 
183 See Murdock, supra note 15, at 427. 
184 See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 512 (Mass. 1975); Arnold, 
supra note 134, at 234; Pontrelli & Montgomery, supra note 180, at 513. 
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ized by trust, confidence, and loyalty.I85 Often, close corporations, 
much like partnerships, are founded by a few people who contribute 
not only capital, but also experience and labor. 186 
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., a Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court opinion, is the leading case for establishing shareholder 
fiduciary duties in the close corporation context. I87 In Donahue, the 
court imposed a duty of utmost good faith and loyalty among share-
holders in close corporations.l88 Euphemia Donahue, a minority 
shareholder in Rodd Electrotype, brought an action seeking recission 
of the company's purchase of the controlling shareholder's shares.l89 
After holding that "stockholders in the close corporation owe one an-
other substantially the same fiduciary duty ... that partners owe to 
one another," the court determined that majority shareholders can-
not avail themselves of the benefit of a stock repurchase without pro-
viding the same opportunity to the minority shareholders.I9o 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court elaborated on the 
fiduciary duties owed to shareholders in a close corporation (often 
called the Donahue doctrineI9I) in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home 
Inc. I92 In Wilkes, the court created a test for the application of the 
Donahue doctrine. I93 If a controlling shareholder proves that there is a 
legitimate business purpose, the conduct will not violate the Donahue 
fiduciary duties unless the minority shareholder can prove that there 
is a less harmful means of achieving that purpose.194 The Wilkes court 
justified this burden-shifting approach by discussing the potential for 
a strict interpretation of fiduciary duties to stifle business decisions.195 
Stanley Wilkes, a director and minority shareholder of the corpora-
tion, brought an action after the corporation both terminated his sal-
ary and voted him out as an officer.196 After establishing the burden-
shifting standard, the court concluded that there was no legitimate 
business purpose for ousting Wilkes.197 
185 See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 512; Pontrelli & Montgomery, supra note 180, at 513. 
186 See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 512. 
187 328 N .E.2d 505. See Arnold, supra note 134, at 234-35. 
188 Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515. 
189 [d. at 508. The company refused to purchase Donahue's shares. [d. at 511. 
190 [d. at 515,518-19. 
191 See Pontrelli & Montgomery, supra note 180, at 509. 
192 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976). 
193 Id. at 663. 
194 [d.; see al50Arnolcl, .wpra note 134, at 237. 
195 353 N.E.2d at 663. 
196 [d. at 658-59. 
197 Id. at 665. 
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The application of the Donahue doctrine, however, may be limited 
in several ways.19B First, these duties only apply to shareholders in a 
close corporation.199 The Donahue court defined a close corporation 
as having "(1) a small number of stockholders; (2) no ready market 
for the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority stockholder par-
ticipation in the management, direction and operations of the corpo-
ration. "200 
Next, the shareholders' relationship to each other must be simi-
lar to that of partners.201 For example, in Harris v. Mardan Business· 
Systems, Inc., the Court of Appeals of Minnesota held that because 
plaintiff was an employee and not a partner, plaintiff was not owed 
fiduciary duties. 202 The court in Harris analogized its holding to the 
fact that partners in a partnership do not owe employees fiduciary 
duties. 203 
Finally, and in marked contrast to withdrawal and expulsion 
remedies in Germany,204 these fiduciary duties may be waived by the 
shareholders.205 For example, in King v. Driscoll and Evangelista v. Hol-
land, Massachusetts courts interpreted how stock purchase agree-
ments affect fiduciary duties. 206 Although the court in Evangelista held 
that the stock purchase agreement would not implicate fiduciary du-
ties,207 the court in King held that when the stock purchase agreement 
is triggered by conduct that violates fiduciary duties, the stock pur-
198 See Murdock, supra note 15, at 436; Pontrelli & Montgomery, supra note 180, at 532. 
199 See Arnold, supra note 134, at 240; Murdock, supra note 15, at 436. But if. Coggins v. 
New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 492 N.E.2d 1112, 1117 (Mass. 1986) (where the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts cited the legitimate business purpose scrutiny in 
Wilkes in a case involving a non.dosely held corporation). 
200 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass. 1975). But if. Sundberg v. Lampert Lumber Co., 390 
N.W.2d 352, 356 (Minn. Ct. App.1986) (citing Minnesota Business Corporation Act 
§ 302A.011, subd. 6a for the requirement that a close corporation have fewer than 35 
shareholders) . 
201 See Murdock, supra note 15, at 436. 
202 421 N.W.2d 350, 353 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). 
203 [d. at 353. If a shareholder, however, was both an employee and a partner, that 
shareholder will be owed fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, 
Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976) (where minority shareholder employee was owed 
fiduciary duties); supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text. 
204 See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
205 See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 518 n.24 (Mass. 1975). The 
Donahue court noted that waiver may be effectuated either through prior agreement-in 
the articles of incorporation or the by-laws--or through ratification. [d.; see also Arnold, 
supra note 134, at 240; Pontrelli & Montgomery, supra note 180, at 535. 
206 King v. Driscoll, 638 N.E.2d 488, 490 (Mass. 1994); Evangelista v. Holland, 537 
N.E.2d 589, 591 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989). 
207 537 N.E.2d at 592-93. 
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chase agreement will not insulate the controlling shareholders from 
liability under the Donahue doctrine.208 In King, the stock repurchase 
agreement was triggered at the end of an employee's tenure. 209 The 
King court concluded that the controlling shareholder's termination 
of the plaintiff was a breach of fiduciary duties.210 However, some 
commentators have noted that courts may scrutinize a waiver, particu-
larly if the drafting or execution of that waiver violates fiduciary du-
ties. 211 
Although several states have followed Massachusetts' lead in fash-
ioning protections for minority shareholders on a fiduciary duty the-
ory,212 Delaware, a leading state in corporate law, has refused to apply 
these duties. 213 In Nixon v. Blackwell, the Supreme Court of Delaware 
implicitly rejected the imposition of fiduciary duties on controlling 
shareholders in a closely-held corporation.214 Although the control-
ling shareholders in Nixon provided themselves with liquidity for their 
shares (through an employee stock ownership plan), the court held 
that the controlling shareholders did not have to provide the same 
opportunities to the minority shareholders.215 The Nixon court main-
tained that the only scrutiny of the controlling shareholders' actions 
would be entire fairness. 216 
208 638 N.E.2d at 494. 
209 Id. at 490. 
210Id. at 494. Cf Blank v. Chelmsford OB/GYN, P.e., 649 N.E.2d 1102, 1106 (Mass. 
1995) (holding that where a stock purchase provision was triggered upon termination of 
employee and employment was terminated pursuant to an agreement that permitted ter-
mination without cause, controlling shareholder's conduct would not violate fiduciary 
duties). 
211 See Arnold, supra note 134, at 241. 
212 See Pontrelli & Montgomery, supra note 180, at 510 & n.5. 
213 See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993). 
214 Id. at 1370, 1375-76. 
'215 Id. at 1370, 1376. 
216 Id. at 1375-76. The "entire fairness" scrutiny takes into account two factors: fair 
dealing and fair price. Id. at 1376. Neither of these factors encompasses the strict fiduciary 
duties outlined in Donahue. Compare Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1375-76 with Donahue v. Rodd 
Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515-16 (Mass. 1975) (contrasting the strict fiducial'y du-
ties required under Massachusetts law with the fairness standard of conduct). 
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II. ISSUES FACING MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS IN CLOSE CORPORATIONS 
A. Control 
In close corporations, the shareholders often participate in the 
control of the corporation.217 Although this may afford minority 
shareholders considerable control over their investments, minority 
shareholders cannot generate opposition to majority shareholder de-
cisions.218 Therefore, majority shareholders may elect to award them-
selves excessive compensation, fire minority shareholder employees, 
refuse to pay dividends, or engage in other self-interested activities.219 
Coupling the ability of majority shareholders to control the corpora-
tion in ways that may adversely impact minority shareholders with the 
illiquidity220 of the minority's shares, adds risk to a minority share-
holder's investment.221 
For example, in the Czech Republic, the need for minority 
shareholder protections has been due partly to the control investment 
funds have exercised over investment coupons.222 Investment funds 
purchased many of the coupons held by Czech citizens in order to 
create large holding blocs in companies.223 Investment funds amassed 
nearly 75% of these coupons.224 Most striking is that the twelve largest 
investment funds (controlled predominantly by banks) administer 
40% of the coupons.225 The investment funds may then use their ma-
jority position to force minority shareholders to sell their shares well 
below market value.226 
217 See KelTY M. Lavelle, Drafting Shareholder Agreements for the Closely-Held Business, 4 
DEPAUL Bus. LJ. 109, 109 (1991); Miller, supra note 13, at 386. 
218 See Murdock, supra note 15, at 488. 
219 See id. at 425; F. Hodge O'Neal, Oppression of Minority Shareholders: Protecting Minority 
Rights, 35 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 121, 121 (1987). One commentator notes that these types of 
behaviors are so widespread that they constitute "a national business scandal." O'Neal, 
supra, at 121. 
220 See infra notes 227-30 and accompanying text. 
221 See Murdock, supra note 15, at 425-26; O'Neal, supra note 219, at 125. 
222 See Medicine, supra note 25; Legislative Changes, supra note 77. . 
223 See Medicine, supra note 25; Legislative Changes, supra note 77. Investment funds en-
ticed coupon holders by offering to redeem coupons at ten to fifty times their value. See 
Balfour & Crise, supra note 46, at 94. 
224 See More Than HalfWay There, ECONOMIST, Mar. 3, 1993, at E6. 
225 See CalToll, supra note 27, at 31. Conflicts of interest may arise because the banks 
that manage investment funds often playa dual role: shareholder and lender. See The New 
Bohemians, supra note 29, at 23. See also Carroll, supra note 27, at 23. 
226 See Medicine, supra note 25; Legislative Changes, supra note 77. But see general~'Y Carroll, 
supra note 27 (discussing the benefits of bank participation in company ownership). 
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B. Illiquidity 
Shareholders in close corporations also face the problem of illi-
quidity.227 Illiquidity refers to the inability of a shareholder to sell or 
transfer his or her interest in the corporation.228 The absence of a 
market for these shares is the predominant cause of this problem.229 
Furthermore, a potential purchaser of a minority shareholder's inter-
est may be deterred because of the minority position the potential 
investor will inherit.23o 
c. Squeeze-outs 
Squeeze-outs occur when majority shareholders seek to effectively 
eliminate minority shareholders from either benefiting from the cor-
poration or participating in the business.231 Some specific examples 
include refusing to pay dividends, granting excessive compensation to 
majority shareholder employees, depriving minority shareholders of 
employment with the corporation, and purchasing the minority'S 
shares at well below their value.232 A minority shareholder's inability 
to control corporate decisions prevents him or her from blocking 
these practices.233 Furthermore, as there is minimal demand for a 
minority interest in a close corporation, the minority shareholder has 
no other means of selling his or her investment than selling at what-
ever price the majority will offer.234 Therefore, the lack of control and 
illiquidity of a minority interest in a close corporation make minority 
shareholders vulnerable to squeeze-out techniques.235 
D. Enforcement 
Many states have generated remedies for minority shareholders, 
but the costs of obtaining those remedies may be prohibitive.236 For 
example, in order to bring an action in the United States, a minority 
shareholder must incur the expense of filing a lawsuit and paying for 
227 See Miller, supra note 13, at 383, 385-86. 
228 See id. 
229 See id. at 385-86; Scogin,Jr., supra note 89, at 129. 
230 See Murdock, supra note 15, at 425; O'Neal, supra note 219, at 121. 
231 See O'Neal, supra note 219, at 125. 
232 See id. 
233 See supra notes 217-21 and accompanying text (discussion of control). 
234 See O'Neal, supra note 219, at 121. 
235 SeeChernichaw, supra note 14, at 508-09. 
236 See O'Neal, supra note 219, at 121. 
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an attorney.237 Although that minority shareholder may eventually ob-
tain a judicially-supervised buyout of his or her shares, the benefits 
gained may be substantially reduced by the costs incurred and the ef-
fort expended.238 
The inadequacy of enforcement mechanisms may also contribute 
to the risks a minority shareholder faces. 239 For example, the Czech 
Republic has statutory protections for minority shareholders, but en-
forcement of those protections remains a problem.240 As of February 
1, 1997, the Czech Republic was still in the process of creating its Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to deal with enforcement 
of the amendment.241 The SEC will take over supervision of trading 
from the Ministry of Finance.242 The SEC will also be given legislative 
enforcement and regulatory powers.243 
Furthermore, the discretionary nature of some remedies may 
create uncertainty.244 For example, the broad nature of wichtige Grund 
in German withdrawal and expulsion remedies creates shareholder 
uncertainty.245 As wichtige Grund implicates personal characteristics as 
well as business behavior (plus other special circumstances for with-
drawal actions), the myriad possibilities for demonstrating wichtige 
Grund create uncertainty in shareholder relationships.246 
In addition, the German judiciary's use of its discretion to 
achieve political ends may contribute to uncertainty.247 For example, 
during the Third Reich, being a Jew was wichtige Grund for expul-
sion.248 In 1942, two shareholders sought to expel the third share-
237 See id. at 121. 
238 See id. 
239 See infra notes 240-43 and accompanying text. 
240 See Medicine, supra note 25; Legiswtive Changes, supra note 77. 
241 See Medicine, supra note 25. According to Mr. Tomas Jezek, Chairman of the Czech 
Stock Exchange Chamber, the Czech Republic was planning to establish its Securities and 
Exchange Commission based on United States, French, and Polish models. See id. The 
European Union has taken an active interest in the Czech Securities and Exchange Com-
mission---citing reinforcement of the Commission as a shon-tenn accession goal. See Ac-
cession Pannel'ship, sU/1ra note 78. 
242 See Medicine, supra note 25. Those in the Czech Republic strongly believe that the 
Securities and Exchange Commission will be tougher on enforcement than the Ministry of 
Finance. See id. 
243 See id. 
244 See infra notes 245-52 and accompanying text. 
245 See Miller, supra note 13, at 397, 410. 
246 See id. 
247 See id. at 398; Scogin, Jr., supra note 89, at 135. 
248 See Miller, supra note 13, at 398. 
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holder-a Jew. 249 The shareholders seeking expulsion claimed that 
antijewish laws would restrict the company's activities because a Jew 
was a shareholder.250 The Supreme Court, in overturning both the 
district and appellate courts, concluded that Jewishness was wichtige 
Grund for expulsion.251 Although the practice of expelling Jewish 
shareholders was condemned after World War II, German courts still 
grant expulsion remedies. 252 
Finally, if a minority shareholder succeeds in pursuing a remedy, 
the nature of the remedy may not adequately address the minority 
shareholder's loss.253 With regard to dissolution remedies, the minor-
ity shareholder receives value for his or her shares, but the business 
entity no longer exists.254 The profit-earning potential of the invest-
ment, along with the goodwill of the dissolved business is lost.255 For 
many minority shareholders, dissolution of the business entity also 
means the loss of a job and its accompanying salary. 256 
Withdrawal of an aggrieved shareholder or a judicially-supervised 
buyout also negates the opportunity to share in future profits, the 
goodwill of the business, and employment opportunities and com-
pensation.257 This remedy permits the minority shareholder to re-
move himself or herself from the business entity, but the majority 
shareholder remains free to pursue the course of conduct that led to 
the minority shareholder's withdrawa1.258 Valuation of the departing 
shareholder's interest also creates difficulties. 259 
Expulsion remedies may not be adequate because the minority 
shareholder must pay for the shares of the departing shareholder.260 
In the event that the minority shareholder is unable to purchase the 
majority shareholder's interest, the business entity will be dissolved.261 
249 See Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen (Supreme Court) decision of 
August 13, 1942, RGZ 169, 330, 330-32 [hereinafter August 13, 1942 Decision), cited in 
Scogin, Jr., supra note 89, at 144 & n.66. 
250 See August 13, 1942 Decision, cited in Scogin,Jr., supra note 89, at 144 & n.66. 
251 See id. 
252 See Miller, supra note 13, at 399; Scogin,Jr., supra note 89, at 152-53. 
253 See infra notes 254-61 and accompanying text. 
254 See supra notes 103, 144 and accompanying text. 
255 See id. 
256 See supra notes 103, 139-40 and accompanying text. 
257 See supra notes 117, 173-74 and accompanying text. 
258 See id. 
259 See supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text. 
260 SeeScogin,Jr., supra note 89, at 158. 
261 See id. at 159. 
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E. Where to Invest 
Due to the globalization of corporations and the opportumtles 
for investment abroad, investors must consider how investment pro-
tections in foreign jurisdictions will affect investment risks. 262 From 
the three countries described in this Note, one can see how the pro-
tections for minority shareholders in close corporations vary.263 Al-
though the perceived return on an investment may be quite high, ex-
posure to the risks of m~ority shareholder dominance may diminish 
the attractiveness of the investment.264 
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDER 
PROTECTIONS IN THE CZECH REpUBLIC, GERMANY, AND THE UNITED 
STATES 
A. Remedies Available 
In the Czech Republic, minority shareholders are protected 
through the recent amendments to the Commercial Code and the 
expulsion rights of a limited liability company.265 The amendments to 
the Commercial Code permit shareholders to obtain fair market value 
for their shares in the event of a takeover of the business entity.266 The 
amendments also provide for shareholder votes whenever a corpora-
tion wishes to cancel the public trade ability of shares or limit the 
transferability of shares.267 If the corporation receives the requisite 
vote, it must then offer to purchase the shares of those who did not 
vote for the change.268 In addition, shareholders in a limited liability 
company may be expelled from the company.269 These remedies per-
mit the business entity to continue, but do not permit the aggrieved 
minority shareholder to continue in the business.27o Although these 
remedies guarantee that the minority shareholder receives fair market 
value, problems of valuation and the loss of future earnings and good 
262 See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text. 
263 See supra notes 77-86, 101-05, 141-42, 171-72, 179 and accompanying text. 
264 See, e.g., 1Wedicine, supra note 25. Foreign investors have avoided the Czech markets 
because of the lack of minority shareholder protections. See id. 
265 See supra notes 71, 77-86 and accompanying text. 
266 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
267 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
268 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
269 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
270 See supra note 257 and accompanying text. 
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will place the departing minority shareholder in a disadvantageous 
position.271 
German minority shareholders in a GmbH are granted several 
remedies: dissolution, withdrawal, and expulsion.272 The dissolution 
remedy prevents the majority shareholder from continuing the busi-
ness, so the minority shareholder faces a proportionalloss.273 Minority 
shareholders may even be able to continue in the business without the 
complications of dealing with the majority shareholder if an expul-
sion remedy is granted.274 
In the United States, minority shareholders have been able to 
obtain dissolution and buyout remedies, but the basis for granting 
such remedies is narrower than the German wichtige Grund.275 This is 
because U.S. courts, unlike the German courts, refrain from looking 
at the personal characteristics of shareholders when determining 
whether remedies should be granted.276 In addition to these reme-
dies, some courts in the United States have recognized fiduciary du-
ties owed to minority shareholders.277 Fiduciary duties, stemming 
from duties owed to partners in partnerships, are unique as compared 
to the Czech Republic, but they may be analogous to the German 
concept of wichtige Grund.278 On the other hand, fiduciary duties con-
trast with German remedies because while fiduciary duties may be 
contractually waived by the shareholders, the rights to withdrawal or 
expulsion on the basis of wichtige Grund may not be contractually 
waived.279 
B. Enforcement of Remedies 
As compared to Germany and the United States, the Czech Re-
public has the weakest enforcement of minority shareholder protec-
tions.28o The Czech Republic was still developing its Securities and Ex-
271 See supra notes 257-59 and accompanying text. 
272 See supra notes 102, 104 and accompanying text. 
273 See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
274 See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
275 See Miller, supra note 13, at 399. 
276 See id. at 399. 
277 See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text. 
278 See supra notes 107, 124-25 and accompanying text. Some breaches of fiduciary du-
ties in the United States may be similar to what would constitute wichtige Grund for with-
drawal or expulsion in Germany. Compare id. with supra notes 181, 184, 188-90 and accom-
panying text. 
279 See supra notes 103, 204-05 and accompanying text. 
280 See supra notes 240-43, 283-94 and accompanying text. 
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change Commission by mid-1997, and the introduction of statutory 
minority shareholder protections did not occur until 1996.281 The 
relative novelty of the Czech Republic's system for enforcing minority 
shareholder protections results in an undeveloped and untested set of 
protections.282 
Germany has a well-established system for granting minority 
shareholder remedies. 283 The courts have been extremely active in 
this area, but the treatment of Jews during the Third Reich remains a 
shadow on the judicial enforcement of minority shareholder protec-' 
tions. 284 The breadth of wichtige Grund has contributed to uncertainty 
in the law.285 Although judicial discretion and the broad reach of wich-
tige Grund permit a more flexible analysis of shareholder relation-
ships, the uncertainty of the legal doctrine may adversely affect these 
relationships.286 
The United States does not have a uniform system for enforcing 
minority shareholder protections because each state within the 
United States enacts its own legislation.287 Some jurisdictions within 
the United States, however, have developed broad bases for granting 
minority shareholder remedies.288 In Illinois, oppressive conduct (a 
basis for granting dissolution) only requires a finding of heavy-handed 
or arbitrary conduct.289 New York's reasonable expectations standard 
(a basis for granting a buyout) allows a court to consider the bargain 
of the parties.290 Finally, Massachusetts fiduciary duties allow a court 
to probe into the good faith and loyalty of the shareholders.291 Both 
the number of remedies that may be available,292 and the broad scru-
tiny used to determine whether remedies should be granted,293 pro-
vide U.S. courts with similar enforcement power and discretion as 
German courts.294 
281 See supra notes 77, 241 and accompanying text. 
282 See supra notes 240-43 and accompanying text. 
283 See supra notes 99-132 and accompanying text. 
284 See supra notes 248-51 and accompanying text. 
285 See supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text. 
286 See supra notes 245-52 and accompanying text. 
287 See Blackburn, supra note 3, at 49. 
288 See supra notes 149-55, 160-66, 179, 198 and accompanying text. 
289 See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text. 
290 See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
291 See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
292 See supra notes 141-42, 171-72, 179 and accompanying text. 
293 See supra notes 146, 150-54, 160-61, 163-65, 181, 190, 194 and accompanying text. 
294 See supra notes 102, 107, 125 and accompanying text. 
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C. Adequacy of Remedies 
The Czech Republic's remedies do not appear to adequately pro-
tect minority shareholders.295 Although shareholders in a limited li-
ability company may be expelled, and shareholders may seek fair 
market value in the event of a takeover, shareholders have no other 
option but to take the money and leave the company.296 Furthermore, 
buyout remedies are only triggered upon takeovers, cancellation of 
the public tradeability of shares, or limitation of share transferabil-
ity.297 As the Czech Republic is trying to attract investors, particularly 
foreign investors, allowing only the option of expulsion or buyout re-
moves the incentive to make the effort to invest in the first place.298 
This is most contrary to one of the goals of the Commercial Code: 
fostering public confidence in capitalism and private business owner-
ship.299 Czech citizens have only recently been introduced to the in-
vestment arena.300 If their first glimpses of shareholding are dominant 
investment funds capable of controlling business decisions and illiq-
uid shares, they may be unwilling to enter the investment arena 
again.301 Foreign investors, with their numerous opportunities for in-
vestment in other countries, will seek more protective states. 302 
German minority shareholders appear to be adequately pro-
tected-they are afforded several remedies and a broad means 
through which to obtain them.303 The problem, however, is that the 
remedies available to minority shareholders may also be used against 
them.304 As wichtige Grund may be established based on personal char-
acteristics of a shareholder, majority shareholders might try to expel a 
minority shareholder for one of these characteristics-being uncoop-
erative, for example.305 
The adequacy of remedies in the United States varies depending 
on the state in which the business entity is formed. 306 In general, the 
major failure of remedies in the United States is that courts have been 
295 See infra notes 296-302 and accompanying text. 
296 See supra notes 79-86. 257-58 and accompanying text. 
297 See supra notes 79-80, 85-86 and accompanying text. 
298 See supra notes 257-58 and accompanying text. 
299 See Black & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1913. 
300 See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text. 
301 See Black & Kraakman. supra note 5, at 1913. 
302 See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text. 
303 See supra notes 99-111, 119-25 and accompanying text. 
304 See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
305 See supra notes 107, 125 and accompanying text. 
306 See Blackburn, supra note 3, at 49. 
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unwilling to expel a heavy-handed majority shareholder.307 From a 
minority shareholder's point of view, either the minority shareholder 
can seek dissolution or a buyout (thereby losing all hopes of future 
profits and participation), or the minority shareholder can remain 
with the corporation with the majority shareholder (possibly seeking 
damages based on violations of fiduciary duties). 308 In neither of these 
scenarios maya minority shareholder continue in the business with-
out the heavy-handed majority shareholder.309 
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING MINORITY SHAREHOLDER 
PROTECTIONS IN THE CZECH REpUBLIC 
In order to alleviate some of the deficiencies of minority share-
holder protections and attract foreign investors, the Czech Republic 
should adopt several aspects of minority shareholder protections al-
ready established by Germany and the United States.310 If German 
and U.S. investors look to the Czech Republic and find similar protec-
tions to those in their home states, they may feel more comfortable 
making an investment there. 311 Increasing minority shareholder pro-
tections, therefore, may attract foreign investors and enable the Czech 
Republic to compete with Poland and Hungary.312 
A. The Relationship Between the Czech Republic, Germany, and the United 
States 
Several factors point to Germany and the United States as candi-
dates for emulation by the Czech Republic.313 First, Germany and the 
United States rank first and second respectively in foreign investment 
in the Czech Republic. 314 German investment accounts for 30% of the 
total foreign investment, and the United States accounts for 14%.315 
Germany has already been moving capital and technology into the 
Czech Republic because of the low wages there.316 
307 See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
308 See supra notes 141, 171-72, 179 and accompanying text. 
309 See id. 
310 See infra notes 325-38 and accompanying text. 
3lI See, e.g., Blackburn, supra note 3, at 9 (discussing how unification of corporate laws 
may facilitate cross-border transactions). 
312 See Medicine, supra note 25. 
313 See infra notes 314-24 and accompanying text. 
314 See Pivnicka & Kreisl, supra note 17, at 6. 
315 See id. 
316 See Medicine, supra note 25. 
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Next, the Czech Republic has already looked to Germany and the 
United States as models for change.317 The Czech Republic's corpora-
tion laws closely model U.S. and German corporation laws.31B The 
Czech Republic planned to create its Securities and Exchange Com-
mission partly based on the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion.319 Furthermore, as a condition for providing much needed capi-
tal, U.S. institutions have demanded that host countries assimilate to 
their styles of doing business.32o According to Mr. Richard Salzman, 
head of the Prague Stock Exchange, "[Czechs] speak English, we take 
advice from Americans, but look at the map. We are going towards 
the German system. "321 
Finally, as Germany is a dominant member of the European Un-
ion, and the Czech Republic is currently seeking admission into the 
European Union, emulating German standards may make transition 
into the European Union easier.322 Already, the Czech Republic has 
signed an association agreement with the European Union.323 During 
the term of this agreement, the Czech Republic has begun to bring its 
laws into compliance with European Union guidelines.324 
B. Improving Shareholder Protections in the Czech Republic-Providing 
Broader Bases for Buyout Remedies 
In order to improve shareholder protections, the Czech Republic 
may wish to broaden the availability of buyouts. 325 Currently, buyouts 
are only available in the context of takeovers or corporate actions to 
cancel the public tradeability of shares or limit the transferability of 
317 See, e.g., id. 
318 See Vassil Bl'eskovski, Directars' Duty of Care in Eastern Europe, 29 INT'L LAW. 77, 78 
(1995). The recent amendments to the Commercial Code are based on European Union 
guidelines and German law. See Tietjen, supra note 78, at 2. 
319 See iWedicine, supra note 25. 
320 See Speeckaert, supra note 4, at 38. 
321 See The New Bohemians, supra note 29. 
322 See Breskovski, supra note 318, at 78-79. 
323 See generally, Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Czech Republic, of the 
other part, 1994 OJ. (L 360/2), as amended by 1996 OJ. (L 343/1) and explained in 1997 
OJ. (C 141/5), available in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN UNION LAw, vol. 3, § 43.2660, et 
seq. 
324 See Breskovski, supra note 318, at 79. 
325 See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text. 
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shares.326 In both Germany and the United States, buyouts are avail-
able when conduct of a majority shareholder becomes intolerable.327 
Broadening the availability of buyouts and imposing fiduciary 
duties on shareholders, however, implicates a need to develop judicial 
standards for those concepts.328 Furthermore, the Czech Republic will 
have to establish a procedure for review.329 Within the past five years, 
both the Ministry of Finance and the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission have played a role in overseeing the trading of shares.33o In 
addition to granting oversight powers to the Ministry of Finance or 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Czech judiciary could 
be granted a role in review.331 
Although dissolution may be considered as an alternative remedy, 
the Czech Republic's need to support competitive enterprises, 
thereby enhancing its market economy and inspiring investor 
confidence, may preclude this remedy.332 Upon dissolution, the cor-
porate entity ceases to exist.333 Even with expulsion, if the minority 
shareholder does not have sufficient capital to compensate the ex-
pelled majority shareholder, the corporation will be dissolved.334 As 
the Czech Republic wants to encourage business, it may not want to 
introduce remedies that destroy business.335 
Perhaps the most effective way to institute change will be to 
adopt an amendment to the Commercial Code.336 This is the means 
by which the Czech Republic adopted its most recent minority share-
holder protections.337 As the Commercial Code governs business ac-
tivities, passing an amendment to the Commercial Code to provide 
broader bases for buyouts is an adequate means to both protect mi-
nority shareholders and inspire investor confidence.338 
326 See id. 
327 See supra notes 107-11. 168 and accompanying text. 
328 See, e.g., supra notes 107-10, 124, 127, 147-67, 187-211 and accompanying text 
(discussing the development of judicial standards in Germany and the United States). 
329 See, e.g., supra notes 112-15, 128-32 and accompanying text (discussing the proce-
dure for obtaining withdrawal or expulsion in Germany). 
330 See supra note 242 and accompanying text. 
331 See supra notes 242-43 and accompanying texl. 
332 See Black & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1913; supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
333 See supra notes 144, 254-56 and accompanying text. 
334 See supra notes 260-61 and accompanying text. 
335 See supra notes 332-34 and accompanying text. 
336 See supra notes 37-40, 77-86 (discussing the Commercial Code of the Czech Repub-
lic and recent amendments affording some minority shareholder protections). 
337 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
338 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
Protecting investors is generally a task left to state legislative and 
judicial actions. The globalization of investments, however, presents 
an added question to these law-making bodies-how will investor pro-
tections affect foreign investment decisions? Particularly with emerg-
ing economies-economies starved for investment from developed 
states-this issue may impact the success of their transformations 
from planned economies to viable market economies. This Note has 
focused on one set of investor protections-protections for minority 
shareholders in close corporations-to see what lessons emerging 
economies may import from developed economies. Mter discussing 
the dearth of remedies available to minority shareholders in the 
Czech Republic, Germany, and the United States, this Note concludes 
that the Czech Republic should adopt an amendment to its Commer-
cial Code that will provide broader bases for obtaining buyout reme-
dies. With the implementation of minority shareholder protections 
derived from developed countries, such as the one suggested above, 
emerging economies may ease the fears of foreign investors and at-
tract the capital necessary for economic growth. 
CAROL L. KLINE 
